Why Focus on Southwest Airlines' Letter to Shareholders?
The airline industry was involved intimately with the tragic events of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 . The four hijacked airliners became bombs that wrought devastating consequences in New York City, Washington D.C., and rural Pennsylvania. The direct and indirect consequences to the airline industry, although a shadow of the human destruction wrought, involved substantial economic and social costs-revenues, profits, and cash flows were significantly impaired, and thousands of employees lost their jobs. An examination of CEO letters of companies in the airline industry seems apt, not only for these economic and social reasons but also because such letters provide a rich textual artifact through which to study the effects of 9/11 on corporate culture and the mood of a nation.
There are several additional particular reasons for our focus on the SWA shareholders' letter. First, SWA airplanes were not among the four hijacked planes, and therefore, one ought reasonably to expect that the company's use of 9/11 rhetoric would be more objective than that of American Airlines and United Airlines, whose planes were hijacked. Second, SWA had not (at least at the date of publication of their annual report and shareholders' letter for 2001) incurred economic losses resulting from 9/11 that were as severe as those of many other airlines. SWA is a purely domestic airline and has a "low-fare, high customer satisfaction" policy (Southwest Airlines Company 2002, p. 1), "twenty-nine consecutive years of profitability"; and according to their annual report in 2001, "thirty consecutive years of 100 percent job security." Such a performance record is unique among airlines. Third, on August 8, 2002 , Merrill Lynch (2002a ranked SWA second of the companies on the Fortune 500 list, based on six measures of earnings quality (Merrill Lynch, 2002b) . Indeed, Merrill Lynch (2002b, p. 22) touted SWA as the "one stock" that was "consistently in either the first or second quintile across all six measures" for assessing the quality of earnings. 1 Fourth, SWA's rhetorical deployment of 9/11 is unique among airlines, as indicated by Table 1 .
Although 9/11 was deployed to a much lesser and more subtle extent as a rhetorical device in the United Airlines' letter to shareholders, it is only in the SWA letter that September 11 constitutes the fundamental and pervasive structure of the letter. Accordingly, the SWA letter to shareholders for 2001 was selected as a relevant example by which to study the deployment of 9/11 in the service of corporate rhetoric.
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Of course, there are grounds for arguing that the uniqueness and idiosyncrasy of the SWA letter ought to justify its preclusion from analysis on the grounds that it is an aberrant outlier and that we will learn more from studying general trends across many companies rather than through case studies of individual outlier companies. of companies. In particular, shareholders' letters that appear to be rhetorical outliers (such as the SWA letter) can reveal important company-specific information that helps us to understand why a particular company differs from other companies, not only in a rhetorical sense but in other areas as well. An anonymous reviewer of this article concurs and has alluded in review comments to the relevancy of the SWA letter as "an example, in the extreme, of . . . cultural ideographs being appropriated to serve corporate ends."
Importance of CEO Letters to Shareholders
A company's annual report, including the portion devoted to the shareholders' (or stockholders') letter, is regarded as a means of mythmaking (David, 2001) and an important part of a "battery of belief-forming institutions" (Tinker, 1985, p. 82) . Shareholders' letters have been studied from a variety of perspectives, including linguistic structure (Thomas, 1997) , disclosure of corporate strategy (Santema & Van de Rijt, 2001) , and corporate communication policy (Kohut & Segars, 1992; Segars & Kohut, 2001) .
Our interest in shareholders' letters is motivated by the following three factors: first, the importance that CEOs place on crafting such letters (Welch, 2001) ; second, the fact that they represent a public and personal commitment of a CEO (Swieringa & Weick, 1987) ; and third, the potential insight they provide to strategic thinking and, thus, the mindset of the corporate leadership (Amernic & Craig, 2000; Craig, Garrott, & Amernic, 2001 ). For example, Wilson (2002, p. 42) , in commenting on Jack Welch and his tenure as CEO of the General Electric Company, writes that those who want a detailed account of the year-by-year evolution of Welch's strategy and leadership in transforming GE will, I am convinced, gain more from his chairman's messages in 20 years of annual reports. Analysis of annual reports, including letters by CEOs to shareholders, has a long history in management and accounting literatures. Such discourse by CEOs is important not only because of the power that corporate leaders wield in their own organizations but also because of their political and cultural influence in general. CEO discourse can be viewed as a form of sense making (Weick, 1995) , which warrants study because the CEO may be talking or writing at least partly to himself or herself and, in so doing, may be engaged in creating, justifying, and reacting to the world thus fashioned.
It is important to appreciate the importance and power of words. We all think, talk, and write, largely in words to help us learn and understand what we then know; CEOs are no different (Lakoff, 1993; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Weick, 1995) . Although at first glance, Jönsson's (1998, p. 411) comment that "managers work with words" seems almost trite and simplistic, it should be acknowledged as containing wisdom that is worthy of contemplation. Not only do corporate leaders use words for strategic expression (Den Hartog & Verburg, 1997; Welch, 2001 ), but their words are often laden with notions of accountability and accounting (Hines, 1988) . Close attention to the words of corporate leaders, through rhetorical analysis, has the potential to improve understanding of managers' ideology, often within an accountability framework (Amernic & Craig, 2000) .
CEO's letters to shareholders are rich textual manifestations of CEO microdiscourse (Alvesson & Karreman, 2000) . They merit close rhetorical examination (as exemplified in Amernic & Craig, 2000; Craig et al., 2001; Franzosi, 1998) . We need to be alert to the benefits of examining "large bodies of narrative data" (Franzosi, 1998, p. 548 ) from a sociological perspective. In addition, we should also appreciate large-scale, computer-assisted approaches to analyzing CEO shareholder letters (as in Abrahamson & Amir, 1996; Hyland, 1998; Segars & Kohut, 2001) . The key point is that research on the words of CEOs is necessary both in focused "microperspectives" (as we engage in here) and also in broader and more ambitious longitudinal "macroperspectives."
9/11 as Part of Popular American Culture: An Ideograph-Like Sign Under Construction The text 9/11 and its variations (such as 911 and September 11) have become an important and pervasive part of public discourse in the United States. Just as members of a previous generation knew exactly where they were when President Kennedy was assassinated, virtually all adult Americans know exactly where they were and what they were doing on the morning of 9/11. 4 That date has become a significant, pivotal point in time, especially for Americans. It has also become metonymy for a host of memories in the reservoir of socially shared experience for Americans, including (but certainly not limited to) "a day of horror," "a cowardly sneak-attack on America," "an assault on freedom," and "wanton destruction of human life." Therefore, 9/11 has characteristics similar to an ideograph, which McGee (1980) defines as an ordinary-language term found in political discourse. It is a high-order abstraction representing collective commitment to a particular but equivocal and ill-defined normative goal. It warrants the use of power, excuses behavior and belief which might otherwise be perceived as eccentric or antisocial, and guides behavior and belief into channels easily recognized by a community as acceptable and laudable. (p. 15) Ideographs "exist in real discourse, functioning clearly and evidently as agents of political consciousness. They are not invented by observers; they come to be a part of the real lives of the people whose motives they articulate" and "are bound within the culture which they define" (McGee, 1980, pp. 7-9) . Some examples of ideographs in U.S. culture offered by McGee (1980, pp. 9-13) include "liberty," "equality," "impeaching," "rule of law," "principle of confidentiality," and "freedom of speech." McGee (1980) contends that ideographs are a link between rhetoric and ideology. This point is elaborated on by Cloud (1998) in her contention that ideographic slogans comprise the building blocks of ideology in a system of public commitments; they are persuasive because they are abstract, easily recognized, and evoke near-universal and rapid identification within a culture. Thus, the dimension of social control and coercion in understanding the ideograph is crucial. It is incumbent upon the critic to question the interests motivating ideographic choices, as well as to assess potential consequences of public adherence to a particular vocabulary of motives. (p. 389) Most (if not almost all) adult Americans are aware of the term 9/11. It seems reasonable to suggest that this term, or one of its variations, would evoke a vivid constellation of reactions when uttered, read, or contemplated. 5 Of course, reactions might differ among different people or groups and also can be expected to differ over time, especially as the date of the actual event recedes into the past. Thus, for many Americans, 1776 likely would have a similar, but not identical, constellation of shared meanings in the years 2002 and 1783 (the year the Revolutionary War officially ended). And like more established ideographs such as equality and freedom of speech, 9/11 may be employed in the service of a wide range of behavior and argument.
Assuming 9/11 is (at least partially) ideographic in nature, we suggest the term, together with the allied discourses that the public mind associates with it and its variations, are potent rhetorical currency. 6 Therefore, given the importance of CEO letters to shareholders in American society, it is worthwhile investigating how 9/11 has been employed in these letters for the corporate financial reporting year following 9/11. Southwest Airlines' 2001 Letter to Shareholders SWA's 2001 letter to shareholders is reproduced in the appendix of this article. Each line is numbered for reference purposes. Presumably, the letter was written very carefully and deliberately, with the intent of serving as a very public, formal statement of corporate strategy and accountability. Yet, it reads as if it were a deliberate parody of the worst excesses of an advertising copywriter-it struggles to rise beyond being an exercise in smarmy self-eulogy.
Like many other CEO letters to shareholders (e.g., that of Enron for 2000-see Craig & Amernic, 2004) , the general impression one gets of SWA, and of the authors, is highly polarized. At one extreme, there emerges a comforting impression that SWA is invincible and can do no wrong, that it is an astute and strategically well-placed company whose future will inevitably be a prosperous one. At the other extreme, we get the worrying impression that SWA is in the hands of senior executives whose view (and management) of the company is self-delusional. One is tempted to wonder whether the gaucheness and euphoria of the letter might reflect an organization that possesses a worrying, underlying psychosis (Sievers, 1999) . The SWA letter invokes 9/11 in an especially dramatic and curious way by quoting Todd Beamer's now-famous and poignant words. Mr. Beamer's story has been immortalized through a wide variety of media, including many Web sites (such as www.beamerfoundation.org and flight93.org/beamer). It evokes the romanticism and nostalgic yearning of many Americans for the personality characteristics of heroism, selflessness, taking action against all odds, and willingness to sacrifice one's life in the hope of saving others. Todd Beamer's words and actions aboard Flight 93 are widely known and are part of the "common knowledge" Americans have of 9/11. But why were these particular words of Todd Beamer chosen by SWA, and why were they used in this way?
Why weren't some other equally tragic and poignant words from the New York, Washington D.C., and Pennsylvania terrorist crash sites used? What prompted SWA's senior management to frame its letter to shareholders this way?
One possible explanation is that a high profile "human interest story"-the heroics of Todd Beamer-has been exploited for its rhetorical value. Fine and White (2002) highlight the capacity of human interest stories to "encourage shared identification" and "bring a population together." The deployment of the Todd Beamer human interest story might then be regarded as a rhetorical ploy, intended to persuade readers to share the particular image, conception, or "worldview of SWA" that was held by the chief executives of the airline.
Another possibility is that SWA tackily exploited Beamer's highly recognizable words as some sort of rhetorical team-building exercise. First, it associates the socially desirable and widely known attributes ascribed to Mr. Beamer to SWA. Then, it places Mr. Beamer's short, dramatic, phrases at key structural points in the letter with the effect of building, in almost a crescendolike fashion, emphasis on the final "LET'S ROLL." It does so too by putting "LET'S ROLL" in capitals at Line 64, and again in capitals, and all by itself, at the close of the letter (Line 131). Will "LET'S ROLL" now become an SWA buzzword for everyone (shareholders, employees, unions, customers, etc.) moving ahead forcefully to do things the SWA way?
Root Metaphor
The first paragraph (Lines 4-9) prompts us to ponder whether SWA presumes that it possesses Todd Beamer's admired characteristics. Is SWA part of what it describes as the "America" that has been "galvanized" into "a state of 'terrible, swift resolve'"? SWA describes Todd Beamer's words as "heroic." It seems to see itself as "heroic" too, implying that it wants to vigorously pursue the "noble, team player, altruistic" work that America, including SWA, has to do-the work of pursuing SWA's "one mission: low fares" (Southwest Airlines Company, 2002, p. 1).
The brave heroic feat and almost Arnold Schwarzenegger-like Hollywoodspeak exhortation ("Are you guys ready? Okay. Let's roll.") by Todd Beamer not only "encases" the letter to the shareholders but also sets the letter's dominant, pervading metaphoric theme or root metaphor:
SOUTHWEST AIRLINES (like Todd Beamer) IS A HERO.
The letter portrays SWA as a hero by invoking allusion to heroic characters from classical literature and contemporary politics. The aftermath of 9/11 is likened to Dante's "purgatory" and "pure 'hell.'" But this is portrayed as surmountable and as mere bagatelle for SWA. The company draws a (mixed?) metaphorical allusion by likening itself to a modern-day Hercules, capable of overcoming the organizational chaos caused to airline flight schedules in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. 8 In addition, the inspirational oratory of Winston Churchill is invoked to portray the self-sacrificial efforts of SWA as demanding "the expenditure of 'blood, toil, tears, and sweat'" (Lines 118-119) .
The symmetry of the Line 4-Line 64-Line 131 rhetorical structure of SWA's use of Beamer's words (along with the switch to capitals for "LET'S ROLL"), seems to "frame" the whole shareholders' letter. Consequently, there is strong merit in analyzing the letter within this overarching frame. Such a frame also seems to suggest another pervasive metaphor:
SWA IS AN AMERICAN (in the same manner as Todd Beamer) WITH "IRON CHARACTER," "UNQUENCHABLE SPIRIT," AND "INSPIRING ALTRUISM."
SWA is a Superhero?
How could a company be as blessed as SWA? It is blessed with employees who are, in keeping with the pervading root metaphor, superheroes. There is nothing that they cannot do. They can cope with "hugely complex and enormously difficult undertakings" with aplomb (Line 15); they can "put aside petty complaints and miniscule concerns" and "work with tears in their eyes" (Lines 66-69). They are employees who their CEO regards as "strong, resolved, dedicated, empathetic, resilient, and also farsighted" (Lines 75-76); "valorous, good-hearted, and united" (Line 124); and as possessing "brave hearts" (Line 128).
Not only is SWA blessed by superhero employees, it also has a superhero management capable of delivering "perfect" financial management. We are invited to believe that SWA is most unlike its financially disabled competitors. The latter, in the aftermath of 9/11, are said to be "pondering the imponderables" of "new business models," "the vagaries of Chapter 11 [bankruptcy protection] proceedings," and their "tenuous future" (Lines 26-28). SWA is promoted as being blessed by a prescient breed of super financial management. Its managers are capable of financially "poising" the company to withstand "hammer blows." They are capable of operating according to a philosophy of financial management, which, by invoking a dubious pharmaceutical metaphor, we are to imagine operates as a "marvelous prophylactic" (Lines 40-41). Not only that, but the financial management of the company is so good, it is capable of achieving what no other company can (or ought) promise to do-it can "guarantee the longevity of our Company" (Lines 49-50).
The prospect that SWA is capable of achieving such financial outcomes is ever more commendable given the environment ("Dante's pure 'hell'" [Line 29]) in which it has been achieved. Indeed, the superheroes in charge of SWA are so good and so hubristic that they have no qualms about invoking the rhetoric of short "financial morality homilies" for the benefit of readers. We read that the management of SWA operates under a divining financial strategy that it presents as if it were revealing to lesser financial mortals some riveting newly discovered insights. In quick succession, we are introduced to such insightfulness: "Liquidity is good, not bad!" (Line 44); "A conservative balance sheet and high credit ratings are good, not bad!" (Lines 50-51); and "Low costs for producing an ASM [Air Service Mile] are good, not bad!" These are all states SWA has been financially managed to attain. The implication is therefore that the management of SWA is also "good, not bad!"
The Gauche, the Clichéd, and the Perverted If there were to be an annual award for the worst opening paragraph in a shareholders letter, the opening paragraph (Lines 4-9) would be a strong candidate. It is "purple prose" at its worst-the stuff of juvenile comic books. The paragraph is laden with cliché 9 (e.g., "iron character, unquenchable spirit, and inspiring altruism"; "galvanize America"), mixed metaphor ("words, flung") and confused word choice.
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The SWA mindset seems to be that its financial successes were inevitable. The very same management that had helped SWA escape the "holocaustic economic catastrophe that afflicted the airline industry from 1990-94" (Lines 35-36) is still in control of the corporate cockpit. Clearly, the authors of the letter have a perverted sense of values and a peculiar understanding of the term holocaust-they employ a term that has become a signifier of the worst inhumanity of Germany in the 1930s and 1940s in a profoundly trivial manner. Also, the juxtaposition of terms in SWA's description of 9/11 as being "a devastating terrorist attack occurring in the midst of a recession" is bizarre. It seems to invite thought that the attack would have been somehow more defensible if it had not occurred during a recession. Perhaps we see here traces of the authors' true philosophical, ideological colors-of commitment to a mystical, mythical market-based economy as the divining feature of contemporary American society? Any thoughts of concern for the sanctity of life and regard for human compassion are marginalized, distant echoes? The implied metaphor, A HOLOCAUST IS AN ECONOMIC RECESSION is repugnant.
Exploitation, Hubris and "SWA as a Great American Patriot"
There is no balanced assessment of the performance of SWA versus its competitors in the airline industry. We are subjected to the rhetoric of bias and of "spin doctoring." One can think of many mitigating circumstances, which would naturally lead SWA to perform better than many of its competitors. For example, unlike American Airlines and United Airlines, SWA did not suffer the deaths of aircrew, passengers, and the loss of aircraft in the 9/11 hijackings.
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Nor did its route network rely heavily on the airports (Boston, Newark) at which security breaches allowed hijackers to board aircraft. Nor were its flight operations affected strongly by the prolonged closure of Ronald Reagan National Airport in Washington D.C.
Discussion
What emerges is a shareholders' letter alive with the metaphorical resonances of the heroism of a doomed passenger on 9/11. The symbolism of the sign 9/11 is appropriated in the service of corporate rhetoric to promote SWA as a "hero" too. The rhetorical intent seems to be to persuade readers that just as everybody loves and reveres heroes, so, too, should they love and revere the management of SWA. This is an extreme form of hubris developed through rhetoric that is too clever-by-half and through 9/11 imagery. As experienced readers of letters to shareholders, we find it even more extreme by virtue of a major "silence." Nowhere, as one might have thought customary in a letter such as SWA's, is there a direct appeal to American patriotism or any invocation of jingoistic expressions to laud America, the American way of life, and America's debt of gratitude to a patriot such as Todd Beamer. Nonetheless, the none-too-subtle implication is that Todd Beamer was a great American patriot and that SWA is a hero like him and therefore a great American patriot.
But perhaps we are too critical of what is, after all, just one CEO letter. Is it "worth" our attention and critical analysis? Are we being too crass by focusing on the words of SWA's corporate leadership? The case that we make for dwelling on what seems an example of curious corporate behavior is rooted in the notion of accountability. CEOs, and indeed all members of a corporation's leadership, are accountable, or ought to be, for their utterances, especially for their formalized utterances via important media such as CEO letters to shareholders. Such letters are acts and not merely words that evaporate into thin air. We must monitor the language used by CEOs and hold them accountable for the language they use because "ideological messages [are] expressed through language" (Grey, 2002, p. 502 ). SWA's language is an ideological signifier; it reveals rather plainly how the company leadership views the "market" and, thereby, ought to be valuable to any stakeholder wanting to form a reasonably accurate assessment of the organization and its objectives, values, and motives. The airline industry was shut down on September 11-and many of our planes, 11 crews, and Customers were required to land, and thereafter stay, in unintended places. 12 Communicating with, and taking care of, those Customers, crews, and aircraft, as well as 13 passengers reserved on flights cancelled, was a herculean task. As the passenger carriers 14 resumed service, reuniting planes and crews "legal to fly" into a coherent passenger 15 schedule was another hugely complex and enormously difficult undertaking. And 16 the FAA and the DOT, reacting swiftly and well to the crisis, were engaged in the process 17 of issuing a veritable cascade of new Security Directives profoundly changing the manner 18 in which Customers, luggage, and airplanes were protected and cleared for flight, thus 19 compelling probably 1,000,000 airline employees to learn, and apply, new security 20 procedures on a daily and, sometimes, hourly basis. Meanwhile, much of our industry 21 was simultaneously and furiously absorbed in: (i) borrowing as much cash as quickly as it 22 could; (ii) deferring or canceling scheduled new aircraft deliveries; (iii) determining how 23 many flights it should cut and how many employees it should lay off, furlough, or put on 24 unpaid leave; (iv) speculating how low its fares might have to be in order to induce 25 passengers to fly, in the aftermath of a devastating terrorist attack occurring in the midst 26 of a recession; and (v) pondering the imponderables of: (a) what new business models it 27 might adopt in radically changed circumstances; (b) the vagaries of Chapter 11 28 proceedings; and (c) how long its tenuous future might be. For the airline industry, this 29 was not merely Dante's purgatory. It was, indeed, Dante's pure "hell," created in one 30 amazing and tragic day.
Appendix
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Southwest was well poised, financially, to withstand the potentially devastating 32 hammer blow of September 11. Why? Because for several decades our leadership 33 philosophy has been: we manage in good times so that our Company, and our People, can 34 be job secure and prosper through bad times. This philosophy served our People and our 35 Company well during the holocaustic economic catastrophe that afflicted the airline 36 industry from 1990-94, when the industry, as a totality, lost a cumulative $13 billion 37 and furloughed approximately 120,000 of its employees, while, during that same 1990-
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